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other things equal, to assume that the newcomers would get no employment. How far the employer really gains by "cheap" labor and how far, because of competitive business, he only seems to gain, is apparently not clear. There is a suggestive discussion of the relation of immigration to crises, but students of crises are likely to find their problem stated in simpler terms and with more assurance than they would accept. In particular the reasoning on pages 357-59 upon the relation of immigration to the crisis, as a phenomenon of underconsumption, and to savings must be unacceptable to many. It may also mislead to declare that immigrants' remittances "are savings actually withdrawn from the wealth of this country and sent abroad to be expended there" (p. 345).

The last chapter (xix) contains a discussion of the effects of emigration upon Europe; its basis of information is scarcely wider than that on the causes of emigration. This again is unfortunate, because the book purports to deal with a world-phenomenon, and also because there is probably much in the European problem of emigration to confirm the author still further in his recommendations for a restrictive policy.

To dwell upon doubts and defects as much of this review has done is only to emphasize again that immigration—truly a world-phenomenon—still offers a field for both the intensive study of conditions and the judgment of theory. Mr. Fairchild's book is itself a good one, the best book in its field today, a book which appears to sustain its main argument better than do its competitors. College courses on immigration can profitably use it both for direct instruction and for argument.

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Progressivism—and After. By WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 8vo, pp. xxxv+406. \$1.50 net.

In this, the latest volume from Walling's pen, we encounter the "economic interpretation of politics" in strenuous operation. It is an attempt to locate certain types of present-day political and industrial progress as successive stages in the increasingly self-conscious historic process culminating in the socialistic consummation. That a complete and absolute social democracy is to be the outcome of our economic, political, and social evolution, notwithstanding well-recognized obstacles and counter-tendencies in the way, admits of no hesitation in the author's mind. It is his working faith even more than his working hypothesis. If it be granted that the present cannot be adequately interpreted except in the light of the past, it is at least equally true that such comprehen-

sion is unattainable except from the vantage point of the future. Walling accordingly assures us that by virtue of his radically sophisticated socialistic standpoint he is able to apprehend in their true historical perspective such contemporary social movements as "Progressivism" and "Laborism," which he finds manifesting themselves with increasing vigor in all the more advanced industrial countries of the globe. He has come to regard them both as passing but essential stages in the march toward Socialism; and, so far from herein underrating their importance, assigns to them a functional significance and far-reaching sociological implications, which to their immediate and partisan adherents necessarily remain obscure.

Our author proceeds from the assumption—which presently reappears as a dogma—that "every ruling social group is an exploiting group," and that the rule of privileged minorities is destined soon to give way to that of privileged majorities, which in turn is sure to be overthrown by the unprivileged masses, when class-rule and exploitation will simultaneously and finally come to an end. To the economic ascendancy of each class or income group in the population there corresponds a characteristic type of social and political organization. Thus, viewed as the sum of the many and earnest efforts now making for "the more scientific organization of industry by government," the progressive movement reflects at the same time the rise into political dominance of the small capitalist and farmer classes, and the parallel displacement from power and privilege of the older ruling class—the large capitalists, "big business," monopoly, or plutocracy. The authoritative spokesmen of Progressivism, under whatever party banner (Roosevelt, Wilson, Lloyd-George, Winston Churchill are most frequently quoted), seem agreed that the principal beneficiaries of their proposed reforms, however broad and even revolutionary in effect they appear, are to be the class of small capitalists, farmers, and professionals whose income is derived in part, if not in chief part, from their own industry and enterprise. These middle classes are interested in the efficiency and conservation of labor, a low cost of living, and the prosperity of wide sections of the population. And the form of politico-economic organization representing this stage in social evolution, namely State Capitalism, is characterized by such policies in taxation, legislation, and administration as are best calculated to secure these ends.

Not only does Walling here concede to a capitalistic régime, as such, another not inconsiderable lease of life, but he finds no difficulty in admitting—in sharp opposition to orthodox Marxists generally—that great

and fundamental improvements in the conditions of life and labor are in store for the wage-earning masses *at the hands of the capitalist ruling class*. Not the progressive impoverishment of the masses, but their scientific uplift and systematic conservation as representing the most valuable natural resource on which modern industry and the small capitalist state are based—this is the slogan of Progressivism. But such improvement and economy, while actually effecting the elevation of the standards of living of the wage-earners, especially of the unskilled, have for their immediate motive neither altruism nor a larger patriotism, but the increase of productivity, profits, and prosperity for the middle classes, which control the government. As soon, moreover, as these capitalistic reforms no longer rebound primarily to the advancement of profits, they will be promptly abandoned. When that point is reached, however—and it is already in sight in certain parts of the world, e.g., Australia—the aristocracy of labor and corresponding income classes will have grown sufficiently powerful both industrially and politically to wield the balance of power in government and to secure for themselves the benefits of a ruling class. This is the stage identified by Walling as State Socialism or Laborism; and this, not out-and-out Socialism, he maintains, is the true objective point of the leaders of the socialist movement today. It is when this stage is reached, he predicts, and not till then, that the essential but persistently neglected conflict of interests *within the working class* will come clearly to recognition. The unskilled masses will be forced to organize against the skilled in order to gain by another and final class struggle that actual equality of opportunity which continues to be withheld from them.

The exploitation of labor by labor is a common enough fact of observation on our industrial battlefield, but it is a phenomenon of recent growth, which Marx failed to foresee, and which his more dogmatic followers still refuse to see. The solidarity of the working class is a pious myth. Contemporary socialist parties everywhere avow it as fundamental truth, making common cause with non-socialistic trade-unions, while discouraging the independent organizations of the unskilled.

Socialism, as distinguished from State Socialism, however, is definitely bound up with the emancipation of the laboring masses as such. It means nothing more or less than their advancement *at the expense* of capital and privilege in every form and guise. It means, therefore, the abolition of all class-privilege and class-rule, and the inauguration of a social democracy, that by means of universal free competition(!) realizes an unconditional equality of opportunity for all.

The reader will no doubt be pleasantly stimulated if not convinced by the author's optimistic faith, which now and then expresses itself in more or less utopian prognostications. From his own premises it is by no means apparent why, instead of achieving their final emancipation, the masses of wage-earners should not be successfully kept in a permanent minority through the constant defection of their upper stratum, and so remain an inferior caste to be exploited indefinitely, though rationally, for the benefit of a homogeneous and class-conscious ruling majority, *within which*, indeed, equality of opportunity obtains. It is only by the somewhat arbitrary assumption of new, vertical, cleavage lines, corresponding to occupational differentiation in the exploiting majority, and the absence of such divisions in the exploited minority, that the author sees any possibility of *relative* advance by the latter. Obviously a gloomy prospect for Socialism, this! On the principle, moreover, that an "upper group will always use its power chiefly . . . for its own purposes" (p. vi), one might legitimately ask: "Why should a permanent subject minority ever attain the political power requisite for wresting from a democratic ruling majority the privilege and power that keep it in subjection?" One is reminded of that fabled feat of the individual who lifted himself by his own boot-straps; and the author himself seems to have been vaguely conscious of the objection, without succeeding in dispelling it.

In view of his final admission that great "progress is to be expected from the successive rise into power and prosperity of new elements of the middle class—and of the upper layers of the wage-earners" (p. 321), and in view of his other admission that "Socialists are very minor factors in bringing such progress about" (p. 168), it is not easy to see why the author should take contemporary socialist parties so severely to task for their opportunism, their "Laborism," and their readiness to support in the spirit of *Realpolitik* measures and policies of social and economic reform championed also by middle-class progressives.

Aside from these inconsistencies, however, the present attempt to interpret "Progressivism—and After" is as penetrating and suggestive as it is timely. The author has performed a notable service to socialists and others alike in presenting them with a critical yet sympathetic evaluation of the historic rôle and function of the great intermediate stages necessarily preceding Socialism, viz., State Capitalism and State Socialism. This analysis should at once sufficiently refute the persistent dogma of the practical impossibility as well as that of the theoretical inevitability of Socialism.

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